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A significant branch of classical cryptography deals with the problems which arise when mis-
trustful parties need to generate, process or exchange information. As Kilian showed a while ago,
mistrustful classical cryptography can be founded on a single protocol, oblivious transfer, from which
general secure multi-party computations can be built.
The scope of mistrustful quantum cryptography is limited by no-go theorems, which rule out, inter
alia, unconditionally secure quantum protocols for oblivious transfer or general secure two-party
computations. These theorems apply even to protocols which take relativistic signalling constraints
into account. The best that can be hoped for, in general, are quantum protocols computationally
secure against quantum attack. I describe here a method for building a classically certified bit
commitment, and hence every other mistrustful cryptographic task, from a secure coin tossing
protocol. No security proof is attempted, but I sketch reasons why these protocols might resist
quantum computational attack.
1 Present and permanent address
I. INTRODUCTION
Quantum computers pose a threat to most, if not
all, standard classical cryptographic schemes. Typically,
classical cryptosystems rely on the difficulty of factorisa-
tion or equivalent tasks, which we know quantum com-
puters can solve efficiently. Even classical protocols
which rely on problems for which no efficient quantum
algorithm is currently known are somewhat suspect at
the moment, since the power of quantum computers is
not well understood.
Fortunately, for key distribution and a few other in-
teresting cryptographic tasks, quantum cryptography of-
fers a complete defence to the threat posed by quantum
computers — unconditionally secure quantum protocols,
which are provably unbreakable by classical or quantum
computers. Unfortunately, this is not true of a wide range
of important cryptographic tasks that allow mistrustful
parties to generate, process or exchange information with
suitable security guarantees. No-go theorems show the
impossibility of unconditionally secure non-relativistic
quantum protocols for many of these tasks — for ex-
ample, bit commitment [1–4,6], oblivious transfer and
some secure two-party computations [7]. In the last two
cases, these theorems apply also to protocols which take
account of relativistic signalling constraints.
Given that unconditional security is unattainable for
these tasks, we have to fall back on weaker notions of
security. One possible approach is to assume that that
reliable bounds can be placed on the size of any quantum
computer in the possession of an adversary, and to de-
vise protocols which cannot be broken by quantum com-
puters capable of manipulating no more than N qubits
coherently [8]. However, it is hard to tell at the moment
whether future technological developments will allow for
any such bounds. It is also known that bit commitment
protocols can be devised which are secure under the as-
sumption that quantum one-way functions exist. [9] How-
ever, identifying good candidate quantum one-way func-
tions is itself a challenge.
It would, at any rate, certainly be good to be able to re-
turn to the “pre-quantum” state of affairs, replacing pro-
tocols which offer computational security against classi-
cal computers with protocols which offer credible compu-
tational security against quantum computers. For exam-
ple, since NP-complete problems are generally thought
unlikely to be solvable by quantum computers in poly-
nomial time one might hope to build protocols whose
security relies on the difficulty of solving a particular in-
stance of a problem whose general case is NP-complete.
(An NP-complete problem has the property that every
other problem in NP can be polynomially reduced to it:
in other words it is at least as hard as any problem in
NP.)
But there is an obvious difficulty here. Mistrust-
ful cryptographic problems require security against both
parties. But if A proposes using a particular instance
of a problem, B has no way of verifying for sure that
the particular problem proposed genuinely is hard. It
is presumably in A’s interests to choose, if she can, an
apparently hard problem with hidden structure, which is
itself very hard to find, but which allows A to solve the
problem easily.
In this letter, I propose and briefly discuss a method
which offers a possible way round this obstacle: using re-
mote coin tossing — which we know can be implemented
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with perfect security by using relativistic signalling con-
straints, and with good computational security without
making use of relativity — to allow mistrustful parties to
generate random instances of hard problems.
I focus on one particularly important protocol — clas-
sically certified bit commitment. In a classically certi-
fied bit commitment protocol, B is guaranteed that A is
committed to some fixed classical bit value, 0 or 1: the
possibility that A’s bit commitment is described, until
unveiling, by a quantum mixture of 0 and 1 can be ex-
cluded. Classically certified bit commitment is stronger
than ordinary bit commitment in the quantum realm,
and cannot be implemented with unconditional security
even by quantum protocols which take account of rela-
tivistic signalling constraints [10].
It is known [11,12] that secure oblivious transfer and,
hence, general secure multi-party computation can be im-
plemented by quantum information exchanges, given a
secure classically certified bit commitment protocol.
II. REMOTE COIN TOSSING
A remote coin tossing protocol was originally defined
[13] as a protocol that allows two mistrustful parties, A
and B, to generate a random bit, in such a way that
each has confidence that, so long as they behave honestly
(whether or not the other party did), the resulting bit b
is genuinely random. In fact, as Mayers et al. pointed
out [14], this seemingly straightforward definition hides
a subtlety. A coin tossing protocol could fail to generate
any bit, if one of the parties chooses to abort the protocol
before it is complete. A cheating party might preferen-
tially tend to abort if the output bit appears likely to
take the value disfavoured by that party.
To allow for this possibility, we follow Mayers et al.
[14] in defining a secure coin tossing protocol to be one
which guarantees the following. First, if both parties
are honest, then Prob(b = 0) = Prob(b = 1) = 1/2.
Second, if one party is honest, then, whatever strategy
the dishonest party uses, Prob(b = 0) < 1/2 + ǫ and
Prob(b = 1) < 1/2 + ǫ. An ideal coin tossing protocol
guarantees this with ǫ = 0. A secure coin tossing proto-
col need not be ideal, so long as it contains parameters
which can be chosen so as to make ǫ as small as desired.
Coin tossing is known to be strictly weaker than bit
commitment in non-relativistic classical and quantum
cryptography. The reason is that any secure bit com-
mitment protocol can be used for secure coin tossing: A
commits a random bit a to B; B returns a random bit
b; A then unveils a and they take a ⊕ b as the coin toss
outcome. On the other hand, it is impossible to build
a secure non-relativistic classical or quantum bit com-
mitment protocol using a black box for secure ideal coin
tossing. [15]
A simple unconditionally secure ideal coin tossing pro-
tocol can be defined by using relativistic signalling con-
straints. Fix some inertial coordinates, agreed by A and
B. Suppose A controls sites A1 and A2, and B controls
sites B1 and B2, such that A1 and B1 are within distance
δ of some agreed point P1 and A2 and B2 are within dis-
tance δ of some agreed point P2, where P1 and P2 are
separated by d ≫ δ. Fix also some time t agreed by A
and B. At time t, A1 sends a random bit a as a classical
signal, to be received by B1; at the same time, B2 sends
a random bit b as a classical signal, to be received by A2.
A and B accept these signals as valid implementations
of the protocol provided they are received (by B1 and
A2 respectively), by time t+2δ. They then take a⊕ b as
the coin toss outcome. Each party is guaranteed that the
outcome is randomly generated, so long as they receive
the other party’s bit at a point outside the future light
cone of the point from which their own was transmitted,
and regardless of whether the other party’s chosen bit
was genuinely random.
Relativistic coin tossing at a high bit rate is emi-
nently practical, but will not work if the parties are un-
able or unwilling to arrange to control suitably adjacent
separated sites. Strangers communicating by phone or
over the internet, for instance, are likely to need a non-
relativistic protocol if they urgently need to generate
random bits. Unfortunately, no unconditionally secure
non-relativistic classical coin tossing protocol exists. It
is claimed [5] that one can demonstrate that no uncon-
ditionally secure non-relativistic quantum coin tossing
protocols exist: to the best of my knowledge, no writ-
ten proof has as yet been circulated. It is known that
unconditionally secure ideal quantum coin tossing is im-
possible. [6]
Another approach to secure coin tossing is to build
a coin tossing protocol from a bit commitment protocol
which A and B trust to be temporarily computationally
secure. They can then use these temporarily secure bit
commitments to implement computationally secure coin
tossings, using the construction described above — so
long as the bit commitment is trusted to be secure for as
long as it takes to exchange messages.
Even in a future world where large quantum computers
are commonplace, it might be reasonable to have great
confidence in the temporary security — for, say, a few
seconds — of standard classical bit commitments. Essen-
tially, this requires problems which, one can be confident,
take considerably longer to solve than to state and com-
municate. Problems which are only polynomially hard
for quantum computers, such as factorisation, might well
suffice.
If temporarily secure bit commitments are used, the
protocols below effectively define a form of bootstrap-
ping, in which bit commitments that are (plausibly) com-
putationally secure for a very long time are built from
secure coin tossings, which themselves are built on bit
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commitments that are computationally secure only for a
relatively short time.
In any case, in the rest of this paper it is assumed that
some trusted secure remote coin tossing method is avail-
able to A and B. This could be the relativistic scheme
described above, a scheme that is trusted to be computa-
tionally secure, or an (as yet undiscovered) uncondition-
ally secure quantum coin tossing scheme that does not
rely on relativistic signalling constraints — or any other
scheme whose security can be trusted. Whichever, we
assume that the security of the scheme extends to mul-
tiple coin tosses, in the sense that the participants can
trust that implementing the scheme N times is approxi-
mately equivalent to sampling N independent and iden-
tically distributed random variables, each corresponding
to a fair coin.
III. A STRATEGY FOR DERIVING BIT
COMMITMENT FROM COIN TOSSING
Abstractly, the basic idea is this. A and B identify
some suitable graded class C = ⊕n≥0Cn of mathematical
objects with the property that there is some increasing
function f(n) such that the members of Cn can be identi-
fied by f(n) bits. They also identify a classD = ⊕n≥0Dn
of mathematical objects, with a relation → defining a
subset of D × C: we say d ∈ D is associated to c ∈ C if
d→ c. Before implementing the protocol, they will agree
on security parameters m and n, and on bit string rep-
resentations for the members of Cm and Dn. They then
carry out 2f(m) secure coin tossings, which they use to
generate two randomly chosen elements c0 and c1 of Cm.
To commit to a bit a, A should then randomly choose
a member d of Dn such that d → ca, and sends the bit
string representation of d to B. To unveil the bit a, A
sends B a description of d and a proof that d→ ca.
Several things are required for this to define a compu-
tationally secure bit commitment protocol.
First, it must be hard for A to identify any elements
d such that d → c0 and d → c1, and such that she has
any significant chance of being in a position to prove
whichever of these results she chooses at the time of un-
veiling. This must be true whether or not her choice of d
is in fact random. One way of ensuring this would be to
ensure that the probability of her, at commitment, being
able to choose any d associated with both ca is very low
or zero. Another would be to ensure that, whatever strat-
egy she uses to choose d initially, and whatever strategy
she follows during the protocol, her chances — call them
p0 and p1 — of generating proofs that d→ c0 and d→ c1
during the protocol, obey pa ≤ Pa, where the numbers
Pa are fixed by her initial strategy in choosing d, and
where they obey P0+P1 ≤ 1+ ǫ, for some suitably small
value of the security parameter ǫ.
Second, it must be hard for B, given a randomly cho-
sen d → ca, to obtain significant information during the
protocol about whether d is likelier to be associated with
ca or ca¯.
Finally, for the protocol to be practical, it must be easy
for A to choose random members of Dn that are associ-
ated to a randomly chosen ca, by a method which easily
generates a proof of the association. Also, the proof itself
must be easy to communicate.
IV. BIT COMMITMENT FROM COIN TOSSING:
POSSIBLE IMPLEMENTATIONS
A. Subgraph isomorphism
One possible implementation is given by creating ran-
dom graphs on which A can define instances of the graph
subisomorphism problem. Take Cm andDn to be the sets
of graphs with m and n vertices, respectively, with the
relation d→ c if and only if d is a subgraph of c.
With these definitions, and having agreed security pa-
rameters m and n with m > n, A and B generate two
random graphs in Cm by carrying out m(m − 1) coin
tosses, one for each pair of vertices, and including an
edge (i, j) if and only if the corresponding coin toss has
result 1. A can choose a random subgraph d ∈ Dn of
either graph ca ∈ Cm by choosing a random size n sub-
set I = {i1, . . . , in} of the vertices {1, . . . ,m} of ca. (I
is a random ordered set, i.e. the ordering of the ij is
randomly chosen; in particular, thus, it is generally not
numerical.) To send B a description of d, she sends the
list {(k, l) : (ik, il) an edge of ca}. To prove to B that
d → ca, she simply lists the ordered subset, allowing B
to check the above procedure has been followed.
B. Subset sum
Another implementation is given by generating ran-
dom sets of positive integers on which A can define in-
stances of subset sum problems, defined on sets of density
close to 1. Take Cm to be the class of sets of the form
c = {c1, . . . , cm}, where the ci are positive binary inte-
gers of length ≤ m. Let Dn be the set of positive integers
less than n2n. Define the relation d → c to hold if and
only if there is a set of integers xi ∈ {0, 1} such that
d =
∑
i xici.
With these definitions, having agreed a fixed n, A and
B can use 2m2 coin tosses to generate two independent
random size m sets, c0 = {a
0
i } and c1 = {a
1
i }, using
each coin toss to define a specified bit of a specified
set element. A can then choose a random set of bits
xi ∈ {0, 1} and commit the bit a to B by sending the
sum d =
∑
i c
a
i xi. To prove to B that d→ ca, she simply
sends an ordered list of the xi.
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C. Remark
Other possible implementations could be based on ma-
trix representability or other problems that are defined
by probability distributions generated by finite strings of
coin tosses and are known to be average case intractable.
[16,17]
V. SECURITY DISCUSSION
Are these protocols computationally secure against
quantum computers? Are they computationally secure
even against classical computers? These are hard ques-
tions. Proving affirmative answers would mean proving
that (BQ)P 6= NP . And even assuming that P 6= NP
and BQP 6= NP , conjectures which are widely believed,
would not imply classical or quantum computational se-
curity. I give here only a short illustrative list of security
worries, folllowed by some reasons for thinking that the
protocols might, nonetheless, be hard for quantum com-
puters to break.
A. Security worries
Consider first security against classical computers. Re-
call that both the subgraph isomorphism and subset sum
problems are NP-complete. (See for example Ref. [18].)
Let us assume that, as is widely believed, P 6=NP. If so,
and if B’s task were to decide whether a graph d was iso-
morphic to a subgraph of a graph c, or whether an integer
d could be written as a binary sum
∑
i xici of knapsack
elements, then it would be impossible to find an algo-
rithm that solved all such problems in a time polynomial
in the problem parameters.
B’s task is slightly different, though. He has to de-
cide whether a graph d is isomorphic to a subgraph of
graphs c0 or c1, or whether an integer d is a subset sum
from the set c0 or c1, knowing that one or the other is
the case. It seems unlikely that this decision problem
is substantially easier than the subgraph isomorphism or
subset sum problems in worst case, since it is hard to
see how to address the first except by trying to solve the
second for each of c0 and c1. But I know no theorem
showing that even these slightly modified problems are
still NP-complete.
An NP-completeness result would anyway not suffice.
B needs to solve average case, not worst case, instances.
So the case for security against B relies on the belief
that subset sum, subgraph isomorphism, or whatever
randomly generated problem is chosen, is average case
hard.
Provably average case complete problems, which could
be used in the protocols above, are known [16,17]. It is
also believed that subset sum is average case hard, for
appropriate parameter choices [19]. However — another
potential concern — these average case results and con-
jectures apply to problem instances chosen from different
probability distributions from ours. Normally, when the
average case of a decision problem — in our notation: is
d → c? — is considered, one assumes that c and d are
independently randomly generated, with suitable proba-
bility distributions. Here, we have three structures, c0, c1
and d, and while c0 and c1 are independently randomly
generated in a standard way, d is not. To ensure that
d→ c0 or d→ c1, and that A knows which, we required
that A use some random algorithm which takes the de-
scription of ca — for her choice of a — and constructs a
d such that d→ ca. We need it to be hard for B to solve
the decision problem, for a random instance, even if he
knows the random algorithm which A uses to define d. (If
security were to rely on A keeping the algorithm secret,
and not just its random input, we would not have a com-
pletely defined protocol. Any published rules which told
A exactly how to implement the protocol would allow B
to break it.)
Obviously, the concerns listed above are still more of
a worry when considering quantum attacks, since quan-
tum computers are for some purposes more powerful than
classical computers, and since quantum complexity is less
well understood than classical complexity.
B. Why might one nonetheless hope the protocols
are secure?
The case for security, such as it is, begins from the
widely shared belief that there is no quantum algorithm
capable of solving the general case of an NP-complete
problem in polynomial time. A commonly cited (e.g.
Ref. [20]) reason for this belief is that NP-complete prob-
lems, such as subgraph isomorphism or subset sum, are
effectively as hard as searching for a particular entry in
a database whose size grows exponentially in the length
of the problem description. The reasoning here is that,
if one wants to decide, for instance, whether a size n
graph H is a subgraph of a size m graph G, there may be
no algorithm substantially better than searching through
all the m!(m−n)!n! subgraphs of G and seeing whether H
matches any of them — the argument being that algo-
rithms which are substantially more efficient than brute
force need some mathematical structure to work with,
and this type of problem just has too little structure to
allow such algorithms.
This intuition could, of course, be wrong. If it were
right, though, it would mean that efficient quantum al-
gorithms for NP-complete problems could, indeed, be ex-
cluded, since we know that the quantum algorithms can
give only a square-root speed-up for database search. [21]
4
Suppose the intuition is right. It is tempting to take it
somewhat further. One might speculate that B’s prob-
lem — searching for a randomly chosen subgraph of one
of two random graphs — is also not substantially easier
than a database search, when m and n are suitably re-
lated and m is large. Similarly, one might speculate that
the problem facing a dishonest A — finding a common
subgraph of two random graphs — is not substantially
easier than finding collisions of a random two-to-one func-
tion, a generalised search problem which is also suspected
(though not proven) to be hard for quantum computers.
If so — if, in the end, the lack of mathematical structure
in each of these problems allows them to resist quantum
attack — then the protocols would indeed be secure.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
The ideas above suggest a possible way forward in de-
veloping “quantum-immune” protocols for general mis-
trustful cryptographic tasks. More immediately, they
add to the motivation for extending the folk wisdom
about — or rigorous bounds on — the power of quantum
computing. Can we find good reasons for extending the
intuition that quantum computers cannot break general
case NP-complete problems to average case instances?
Can we extend those intuitions further to collision-type
problems such as identifying a common subgraph of ran-
dom graphs? Or, conversely, and against expectation,
could there be reasons to believe that quantum attacks
may indeed be effective in these last two cases?
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